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Article 6

Discrimination Lurking on the Books:
Examining the Constitutionality of the
Minneapolis Lurking Ordinance
Vanessa Wheelert
Introduction
The Minneapolis lurking law section 385.80 states: "No
person, in any public or private place, shall lurk, lie in wait or be
concealed with intent to commit any crime or unlawful act."1 The
Minneapolis community is divided over the desirability of the
lurking law. Some citizens approve of the ordinance as a means of
providing law enforcement officers effective crime-fighting tools,
while others argue that it allows police officers too much discretion
to use those tools discriminatorily.2
City Council members, 3 advocacy groups,4 and criminal
justice advocates5 have all criticized the law as discriminatory.
"[The lurking law criminalizes] standing on a corner after ten

t. J.D. expected 2009, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2005, St. Olaf
College. I would like to thank the editors and staff of Law and Inequality: A
Journal of Theory and Practice for their efforts in bringing this Article to
publication.
1. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 385.80 (2005). Violation of
the ordinance is punishable by a fine of up to seven hundred dollars, imprisonment
of up to ninety days, or both. Id. § 1.30.
2. See Vickie Evans Nash, Beware! Discrimination Lurking in Minneapolis,
TWIN CITIES DAILY PLANET, Apr. 20, 2007, http://www.tcdailyplanet.net/node/4340
(last visited June 9, 2008); Mike Mosedale, What Lurks Beneath?, CITY PAGES, Feb.
28, 2007, at 13, available at http://articles.citypages.com/2007-02-28/news/whatlurks-beneath/.
3. See Nash, supra note 2 ("Currently, city council members Gary Schiff,
Betsey Hodges, Elizabeth Glidden and Cam Gordon have already expressed their
intent to back the repeal [of § 385.80], with council members Diane Hofstede and
Don Samuels still undecided.").
4. See More on Our "Lurking" Ordinance, http://secondward.blogspot.com
/2007 03 01 archive.html (Mar. 16, 2007, 15:50 CST) [hereinafter Our Lurking
Ordinance] (listing community organizations and foundations that support repeal
of the lurking ordinance, including the NAACP, the African American Men Project,
and the Minneapolis Urban League). This information comes from Minneapolis
Second Ward City Council Member Cam Gordon's blog, which he uses as a public
policy forum to discuss council activities and explain his position on various issues.
Id.
5. See Mosedale, supra note 2, at 13.
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o'clock at night when you're [B]lack." 6 Despite such criticisms,
others in the community feel the law is justified. In response to
challengers who argued that the lurking law is discriminatory, the
President of the City Council argued: "[If] you're the person who is
waiting for the bus and is frightened by someone who is lurking,
what validity does [a claim of racial disparity] have?" 7 In order to
repeal the ordinance, a majority of Minneapolis City Council
members must support the repeal.8 However, repeal will not come
without a fight from those members of the community who feel
that the law makes their neighborhoods safer.9
With the
community divided over the desirability of the lurking law, it is
important to step back and understand the underlying issues by
analyzing section 385.80 in light of the history of vagrancy and
loitering laws throughout the United States, the history of the
ordinance itself, and relevant constitutional law.
This Article identifies probable constitutional violations
embedded in the lurking law and recommends that the City
Council repeal section 385.80. Part I explores the context of
section 385.80 by examining the history and relevant case law on
loitering and vagrancy laws in the United States generally, and
Minneapolis loitering and lurking laws specifically.
Part II
examines potential constitutional challenges to the "lurking law,"
focusing on vagueness, overbreadth, and Fourth Amendment
violations. The Article concludes that, in addition to being
unconstitutional, the lurking law is rendered unnecessary by
section 385.50, the city's more carefully constructed and detailed
loitering ordinance. °
I.

Lurking, Loitering, and Vagrancy Laws: A History

The Minnesota Supreme Court has noted that, "[despite
doubtless differences in nuance, 'lurking' is not significantly
different from 'loitering.'"'" Therefore, an examination of loitering
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 4, § 9 (2005).
9. See Nash, supra note 2.
10. § 385.50 ("No person shall loiter on the streets or in a public place or in a
place open to the public with intent to solicit for the purposes of prostitution, illegal
narcotic sale, distribution, purchase or possession, or any other act prohibited by
law.").
11. State v. Armstrong, 162 N.W.2d 357, 360 (Minn. 1968). The court found the
term "loitering" to be "a term of common usage with a meaning reasonably
understood by persons of common intelligence," yet failed to give it a definition. Id.
The court also found that, "[a] lthough 'lurking' may have a primary connotation of
hiding or concealment, it equally connotes a persistent presence or a furtive
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laws illustrates the likely constitutional challenges the lurking
law will face. This Section begins by examining the history of
loitering laws in the United States and then explains typical
constitutional challenges to such laws. Finally, this Section
explores Minneapolis lurking and loitering laws in detail, focusing
on the enactment and enforcement history of sections 385.80 and
385.50.
A. Evolution of Loitering Laws in the United States
1. An Early History
American loitering laws derive from English vagrancy laws."2
The breakdown of the feudal system in England following the
Black Plague led to the passage of the Statute of Labourers in
1349.13 The goal of the statute was to combat labor shortages by
prohibiting labor movement and wage increases. 4 Following the
collapse of the feudal system, vagrancy laws survived as a means
of crime prevention, as it was thought that the unemployed
supported themselves through crime." English vagrancy laws also
typically included prohibitions against loitering, reflecting the
overlapping nature of the "offenses" of loitering and vagrancy.16
Early in their history, the American colonies adopted
loitering and vagrancy laws similar to those of England that were
also founded on principles of crime prevention. 7 A typical statute
defined a vagrant as "any person who wanders or strolls about in
idleness, or lives in idleness, who is able to work, and has no
property sufficient for his support." 8 The constitutionality of
these laws went virtually unchallenged for nearly two hundred
years, due in large part to the fact that poor defendants had little
access to legal counsel.' 9 In the 1960s, soon after the Supreme

movement in a place." Id.
12. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 161-62 (1972).
13. See id.
14. Id. at 161.
15. See Joel D. Berg, The Troubled Constitutionality of Antigang Loitering
Laws, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 461, 463 (1993).
16. See id. at 462 n.15 (explaining the nexus between vagrancy and loitering).
Loitering is often defined in terms of spending time idly, while vagrancy is often
understood as pertaining to an idle person without visible means of support who
wanders from place to place. Id.
17. Id. at 463-64.
18. Robin Yeamans, ConstitutionalAttacks on Vagrancy Laws, 20 STAN. L. REV.
782, 783 (1968) (quoting an Alabama statute no longer in force).
19. See id.
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Court decided Gideon v. Wainwright,2 ° which guaranteed legal
representation to any indigent defendant charged with a felony,
challenges to vagrancy laws began to gain momentum.21
2.

Evolving Attitudes

After Gideon, more and more courts began hearing
constitutional challenges to vagrancy and loitering laws.22
In
1972, the Supreme Court unanimously struck down a vagrancy
ordinance as unconstitutionally vague in Papachristouv. City of
Jacksonville.23 The Court held that the vagrancy law at issue
failed to give citizens adequate notice of what conduct was
forbidden, and the law did not sufficiently limit police discretion. 4
The Court was concerned that the law did not give fair notice of
the forbidden conduct to the "poor among us, the minorities, [and]
the average householder ....
2 The Court also noted that the
ordinance's vagueness led to discriminatory enforcement, allowing
"men to be caught who are vaguely undesirable in the eyes of

20. 372 U.S. 335, 339-40 (1963).
21. See Berg, supra note 15, at 464.
22. See, e.g., Baker v. Bindner, 274 F. Supp. 658, 662 (W.D. Ky. 1967) (finding a
Kentucky vagrancy statute unconstitutional for vagueness and overbreadth);
United States v. Margeson, 259 F. Supp. 256, 268 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (finding a New
Jersey law, which defined a "disorderly person" as someone unable to account for
his presence, unconstitutionally vague); Alegata v. Commonwealth, 231 N.E.2d
201, 204-05 (Mass. 1967) (finding a Massachusetts statute, which allowed police to
arrest persons walking at night who were unable to account for themselves,
unconstitutionally vague); Fenster v. Leary, 229 N.E.2d 426, 427-28 (N.Y. 1967)
(finding a New York law, which punished persons "(1) being without visible means
of support, (2) being without employment, and (3) being able to work but refusing to
do so" as vagrants, violated due process and gave police too much discretion in
enforcing the law (quoting the statute)).
23. 405 U.S. 156, 156 (1972). The Jacksonville ordinance at issue, Ordinance
Code § 26-57, read:
Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging,
common gamblers, persons who use juggling or unlawful games or plays,
common drunkards, common night walkers, thieves, pilferers or
pickpockets, traders in stolen property, lewd, wanton and lascivious
persons, keepers of gambling places, common railers and brawlers, persons
wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful
purpose or object, habitual loafers, disorderly persons, persons neglecting
all lawful business and habitually spending their time by frequenting
houses of ill fame, gaming houses, or places where alcoholic beverages are
sold or served, persons able to work but habitually living upon the
earnings of their wives or minor children shall be deemed vagrants and,
upon conviction in the Municipal Court shall be punished as provided for
Class D offenses.
Id. at 156-57 & n.1 (quoting JACKSONVILLE, FLA., ORDINANCE CODE § 26-57,
invalidatedby Papachristou,405 U.S. 156).
24. Id. at 162.
25. Id. at 162-63.
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police and prosecution, although not chargeable with any
particular offense." 6 Finally, the Court was concerned about
possible violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments in
enforcing such a vague law.27
Since the Court's decision in Papachristou,state and federal
courts around the country have ruled on the constitutionality of
vagrancy and loitering laws. Courts generally find that vagrancy
statutes are void-for-vagueness or that they impermissibly punish
status.28
Similarly, statutes that target mere loitering are
generally found unconstitutional; 9 however, loitering laws that
are more narrowly drawn tend to survive constitutional
challenges. ° Loitering legislation is particularly prone to judicial
disapproval where the legislature fails to sufficiently define or give
examples of loitering so as to give the public notice of prohibited
conduct and to narrow law enforcement discretion.3
As society faces increasing crime rates, particularly in inner
cities, city and state governments have attempted to combat these
societal problems through the use of ordinances and statutes that
prohibit loitering for a specific purpose. 2 Despite careful crafting,

26. Id. at 165-66.
27. See id. at 169.
28. See, e.g., id. at 162; Derby v. Town of Hartford, 599 F. Supp. 130, 130 (D. Vt.
1984) (holding a town vagrancy ordinance unconstitutional for vagueness and
overbreadth because it allowed unguided discretion for the enforcing officer); State
v. Richard, 836 P.2d 622, 628-29 & n.1 (Nev. 1992) (finding a vagrancy law
unconstitutional for punishing the status of being a vagrant-a person who "loiters,
prowls, or wanders upon the private property of another, without visible or lawful
business with the owner" (quoting the Nevada statute)); 77 AM. JUR. 2D, Vagrancy
§ 2 (2007); Frank J. Wozniak, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application
of Loitering Statutes and Ordinances, 72 A.L.R. 5th 1 (1999).
29. See Wozniak, supra note 28, at 22-23; see, e.g., Bullock v. City of Dallas,
281 S.E.2d 613, 615-16 (Ga. 1981) (finding a loitering law unconstitutionally vague
and overbroad); City of Portland v. White, 495 P.2d 778, 778 (Or. Ct. App. 1972)
(finding a loitering law unconstitutionally vague).
30. See, e.g., State v. Kemp, 429 So. 2d 822, 824 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
(holding an ordinance, which forbids loitering that hinders pedestrians and
vehicles, was not overbroad or vague); Bell v. State, 313 S.E.2d 678, 681 (Ga. 1984)
(holding that a Georgia loitering statute, which required circumstances warranting
justifiable concern for persons or property and that listed factors to be considered
by officers, was not unconstitutionally vague); City of Tacoma v. Luvene, 827 P.2d
1374, 1386 (Wash. 1992) (holding that a drug-loitering ordinance that required
specific intent and overt acts was not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague).
31. Wozniak, supra note 28, at 22; see, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352,
357-58 (1983) (finding a loitering law unconstitutional because it did not
sufficiently define what constituted "credible and reliable" identification); State v.
Aucoin, 278 A.2d 395, 395 (Me. 1971) (finding the term "loitering" provided an
incomprehensible standard and was therefore inadequate in delimiting criminal
conduct).
32. See generally Michael J. Rossi, Striking a Balance: The Efforts of One
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even some of these specific-purpose, anti-loitering measures have
In the latest
been attacked for constitutional deficiencies. 3
loitering case to reach the Supreme Court City of Chicago v.
Morales,' the Court found Chicago's anti-gang loitering law
unconstitutionally vague because it failed to establish minimal
Constitutional jurisprudence
guidelines for enforcement. 35
spanning from Papachristouthrough the present has significantly
limited the scope of activities that loitering laws may
constitutionally reach.36
B.

ConstitutionalChallenges to Loitering Laws

While there are a variety of laws aimed at crime prevention,
31
including the laws of attempt, solicitation, and conspiracy,
Massachusetts City to Draft an Effective Anti-Loitering Law Within the Bounds of
the Constitution, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1069, 1069-88 (2006) (discussing postMorales attempts to draft constitutional loitering laws); Kim Strosnider, Anti-Gang
OrdinancesAfter City of Chicago v. Morales: The Intersection of Race, Vagueness
Doctrine, and Equal Protection in the Criminal Law, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 101,
101-46 (2002) (surveying anti-gang statutes and ordinances).
33. See sources cited supra note 31.
34. 527 U.S. 41, 41 (1999).
35. Id. The Chicago ordinance stated:
(a) Whenever a police officer observes a person whom he reasonably
believes to be a criminal street gang member loitering in any public place
with one or more other persons, he shall order all such persons to disperse
and remove themselves from the area. Any person who does not promptly
obey such an order is in violation of this section.
(b) It shall be an affirmative defense to an alleged violation of this section
that no person who was observed loitering was in fact a member of a
criminal street gang.
(c) As used in this Section:
(1) 'Loiter' means to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose.
(2) 'Criminal street gang' means any ongoing organization, association
in fact or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal,
having as one of its substantial activities the commission of one or more of
the criminal acts enumerated in paragraph (3), and whose members
individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of
criminal gang activity.
Id. at 47 n.2 (quoting CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 8-4-015 (1990) (effective June
17, 1992), invalidated by Morales, 527 U.S. 41). The Court's unusually narrow
holding focused on the possibility for discrimination with six justices finding that
the ordinance's definition of loitering was so vague that it provided law
enforcement officers too much discretion in making arrests. See Debra Livingston,
Gang Loitering, the Court, and Some Realism About Police Patrol, 1999 SUP. CT.
REV. 141, 156-57.
36. Peter W. Poulos, Chicago's Ban on Gang Loitering: Making Sense of
Vagueness and Overbreadth in Loitering Laws, 83 CAL. L. REV. 379, 383 (1995).
37. Jordan Berns, Is There Something Suspicious About the Constitutionalityof
See generally JOSHUA
Loitering Laws?, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 717, 717 (1989).
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 405-95 (4th ed. 2006) (surveying
criminal law substance and theory, including common law doctrines, the Model
Penal Code ("MPC"), and constitutional law affecting criminal law).
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"loitering statutes and ordinances are probably the most
controversial laws used to prevent crime." 8 A basic tenet of
criminal law is that bad thoughts alone ought not be punished;
thus, American criminal law generally requires both an actus reus
and a mens rea element.39 One exception to this general rule is
loitering statutes. Loitering laws rarely require any independent
criminal act and thereby provide police officers and courts with
substantial discretion in applying such laws. ° Courts employ
several tests to determine the constitutional validity of loitering
laws in order to minimize such abuses of discretion.
1. The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine
derives
from
the
doctrine
The
void-for-vagueness
constitutional requirement of due process. 4' Due process requires
that laws be defined with sufficient clarity so that citizens
understand what conduct is prohibited. 2 The void-for-vagueness
doctrine involves two central principles: notice and the prohibition
against arbitrary enforcement.43 Laws that fail to meet these
standards are void-for-vagueness and constitutionally deficient. 4
Under the first prong of the void-for-vagueness test, the
penal statute must provide notice by "defin[ing] the criminal
offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can
understand what conduct is prohibited."4" In Papachristou, the
Supreme Court emphasized that all persons are entitled to know
what the law "commands and forbids."' More important than the
38. Berns, supra note 37, at 717.
39. See DRESSLER, supra note 37, at 91-93 (explaining the actus reus and mens
rea components of a crime and the rationale behind the act requirement).
40. Berg, supra note 15, at 467.
41. The Fifth Amendment applies to the federal government and provides that
"[n]
o person shall be ...deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment applies to states
and provides that "[n]o state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law ....... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see
Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) ("[A] statute which either
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application,
violates the first essential of due process of law."); Berg, supra note 15, at 468.
42. See Connally, 269 U.S. at 391 ("That the terms of a penal statute creating a
new offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what
conduct on their part will render them liable, is a well recognized requirement ...
."); Berg, supra note 15, at 468.
43. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983); Papachristou v.
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972).
44. Berg, supra note 15, at 468.
45. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357.
46. Papachristou,405 U.S. at 162.
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notice aspect of the vagueness doctrine is "the requirement that a
legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law
enforcement. Where the legislature fails to provide such minimal
guidelines, a criminal statute may permit a standardless sweep
that allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their
personal predilections."4 7 Under this second prong of the void-forvagueness doctrine, the legislated crimes must be sufficiently clear
so as not to encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.4
In Kolender v. Lawson,49 the Supreme Court invalidated a
California statute requiring persons who loiter to provide "credible
and reliable" identification and to account for their presence when
requested by a police officer.5" The Court found the statute
unconstitutionally vague because it did not clarify what
constituted "credible and reliable" identification, thereby allowing
police officers complete discretion to determine if the statute was
satisfied."1
While loitering laws are especially prone to vagueness
challenges, carefully crafted loitering laws can pass constitutional
muster. 2 Most constitutionally valid loitering laws include both
an intent element and a conduct element.53 For example, in City of
Cleveland v. Howard,' the court upheld a loitering statute with
guidelines relating "to the intent of the offending party and
delineat[ing] some of the overt conduct that an officer might
consider. . . .""
However, even when a statute requires intent and lists
examples of prohibited conduct, a court may still find the statute
unconstitutional. For example, courts are split even as to the
constitutionality of loitering statutes based on the Model Penal

47. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 (citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574
(1974)); see also Strosnider, supra note 32, at 120-26 (discussing the connection
between the arbitrary enforcement prong of the vagueness doctrine and equal
protection concerns and arguing that the vagueness doctrine is a way for courts to
get around the heightened levels of proof required to prove discriminatory purpose).
48. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357. As far back as 1875, the Court expressed
concern over minimal guidelines.
"It would certainly be dangerous if the
legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it
to the courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who
should be set at large." United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875).
49. 461 U.S. 352.
50. Id. at 357, 361.
51. Id. at 358.
52. Wozniak, supra note 28, at 25-31.
53. See Berg, supra note 15, at 492.
54. 532 N.E.2d 1325 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1987).
55. Id. at 1330.
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Code, 6 which provides in part that a person commits a violation if
he or she "loiters or prowls in a place, at a time, or in a manner not
usual for law-abiding individuals, under circumstances that
warrant alarm for the safety of persons or property in the
vicinity."57 Even statutes that aim to prevent loitering for a single
purpose, such as loitering for the purpose of soliciting prostitution
or engaging in illegal drug transactions, have been held
unconstitutional. 58
For example, in Coleman v. City of
Richmond, 9 the court held unconstitutional a law aimed at
preventing loitering with the intent to solicit prostitution and
listed three types of conduct that could trigger application of the
law.6" The court found that, if the delineated acts were sufficient
in and of themselves to demonstrate intent, then the statute was
overbroad
because
the
contemplated
conduct
included
constitutionally protected acts."' If the acts were insufficient in
and of themselves to demonstrate intent, then the law was
unconstitutionally vague since it no longer carried an intent

56. Compare Fields v. City of Omaha, 810 F.2d 830 (8th Cir. 1987) (invalidating
a loitering law based on the MPC for vagueness), with State v. Ecker, 311 So. 2d
104 (Fla. 1975) (upholding a loitering law based on the MPC).
57. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.6 (1962).
58. Poulos, supra note 36, at 383.
59. 364 S.E.2d 239 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
60. Id. at 242-43. The relevant portion of the ordinance reads:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person, within the city limits, to loiter, lurk,
remain, or wander about in a public place, or in any place within view of
the public or open to the public, in a manner or under circumstances
manifesting the purpose of engaging in prostitution, or of patronizing a
prostitute, or of soliciting for or engaging in any other act which is lewd,
lascivious or indecent. Among the circumstances which may be considered
in determining whether any such purpose is manifested by a particular
individual are the following:
(i) that, to the knowledge of the arresting officer at the time of arrest, such
individual has within one year prior to the date of arrest been convicted of
any offense chargeable under this section, or under any other section of
this Code or the Code of Virginia, relating to prostitution, pandering, or
any act proscribed as lewd, lascivious or indecent;
(ii) that such individual repeatedly beckons to, stops, attempts to stop, or
interferes with the free passage of other persons, or repeatedly attempts to
engage in conversation with passersby or individuals in stopped or passing
vehicles; or
(iii) that such individual repeatedly stops or attempts to stop motor vehicle
operators by hailing, waving arms, or other bodily gestures. No arrest
shall be made for a violation of this section unless the arresting officer first
affords such person an opportunity to explain the conduct in question, and
no one shall be convicted of violating this section if it appears at trial that
the explanation given was true and disclosed a lawful purpose.
Id. at 242 (quoting RICHMOND, VA., CITY CODE § 20-83, invalidated by Coleman,
364 S.E.2d 239).
61. Id. at 243.
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element. 2
Therefore, the court found that the law simply
"proscribes loitering with an unlawful intent; since loitering is not
unlawful, the statute proscribes no illegal conduct."'
Coleman
illustrates the care required in drafting sufficiently clear loitering
laws and demonstrates that even a requirement of intent and a
conduct element cannot always save a law from a void-forvagueness challenge.
2.

The Overbreadth Doctrine

Closely related to the void-for-vagueness doctrine is the
overbreadth doctrine,' which courts also use in finding loitering
laws
unconstitutional.65
Impermissible
vagueness
(i.e.
overbreadth) leads to the possibility that the statute will reach
constitutionally protected activities, chilling the exercise of those
rights and encouraging arbitrary enforcement.' Derived from the
First Amendment,67 the overbreadth doctrine invalidates statutes
that substantially infringe upon constitutionally protected
activities, regardless of whether or not the statutes may be
legitimately applied in a particular case.'
However, the
application of the doctrine has its limits.69 The Supreme Court
recognizes the overbreadth doctrine as "strong medicine" that will
not be "invoked when a limiting construction has been or could be
placed on the challenged statute.""° In order to facially invalidate
statutes primarily governing conduct, "the overbreadth of a
statute must not only be real, but substantial as well ...
62. Id.
63. Id. at 244.
64. See Poulos, supra note 36, at 394 (arguing that vagueness and overbreadth
in loitering laws can be analyzed under a single approach because both doctrines
are concerned with preventing chilling effects on the exercise of constitutionally
protected rights and preventing arbitrary enforcement).
65. See, e.g., Johnson v. Carson, 569 F. Supp. 974, 977-80 (D.C. Fla. 1983)
(striking down a loitering ordinance that prohibited loitering for the purpose of
prostitution for overbreadth since it reached innocent, protected activities);
Coleman, 364 S.E.2d at 241, 244 (finding a loitering with intent to solicit
prostitution statute unconstitutional because it was overbroad in violation of the
First Amendment and vague in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment).
66. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 464 (1987) (holding a law
prohibiting harassing police officers overbroad and finding it encouraged arbitrary
enforcement).
67. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
68. 16 C.J.S. ConstitutionalLaw § 117 (2005).
69. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 615.
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Loitering laws are particularly susceptible to overbreadth
challenges because they often encroach on First Amendment
73
rights," including the freedoms of association,73 assembly,7472 and
even thought." In fact, overbreadth as a doctrine originated in
Thornhill v. Alabama,6 which struck down a statute prohibiting
loitering for the purpose of influencing others not to associate with
a business.77 Since then, other loitering laws have been struck
down for overbreadth. For example, in Farber v.Rochford, the
court found a violation of the right to assemble in a Chicago
ordinance that made it unlawful to loiter near establishments
serving alcohol with anyone known to be an alcoholic, drug dealer,
drug user, or prostitute. 9
In Coleman, the court found the
ordinance, which prohibited loitering with intent to engage in
prostitution, chilled the rights of expression and of association. °
Finally, the right to freedom of thought is inherent in the First
Amendment and protected by the "liberty" guarantee of the Due
Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 81
Freedom of thought encompasses the freedom to think bad
thoughts and even to contemplate crime. 81
Since the act of
loitering by itself is not criminal nor a sufficient act upon which to
establish mens rea,83 mere loitering with intent statutes are

72. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Berg, supra note 15, at 474.
73. Berg, supra note 15, at 475-76.
74. See id. at 467-77.
75. See infra text accompanying notes 81-84.
76. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
77. See John F. Decker, Overbreadth Outside the First Amendment, 34 N.M. L.
REV. 53, 65 (2004) (asserting that the First Amendment doctrine of overbreadth
originated in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. at 96-98, 107).
78. 407 F. Supp. 529 (D.C. Ill. 1975).
79. Id. at 534.
80. Coleman v. City of Richmond, 364 S.E.2d 239, 241, 244 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
81. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937) ("[Nleither liberty nor justice
would exist if [the privileges and immunities, incorporated to apply to the states by
the Fourteenth Amendment,] were sacrificed. This is true, for illustration, of
freedom of thought and speech. Of that freedom one may say that it is the matrix,
the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom." (citation
omitted)), overruled on other grounds by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793
(1969).
82. Proctor v. State, 176 P. 771, 772 (Okla. Crim. App. 1918) ("Guilty intention.
[is not] the subject of punishment .... ."); see also Pamela Sirkin, The Evanescent
Actus Reus Requirement: CaliforniaPenal Code § 647 (d) - Criminal Liability for
"Loitering with Intent . . ."Is Punishment for Merely Thinking Certain Thoughts
While Loitering Constitutional?,19 Sw. U. L. REV. 165, 190-93 (1990) (arguing that
California's section 647 violates the First Amendment by punishing mere thought).
83. Coleman, 364 S.E.2d at 242 ("Loitering, wandering, idling, and lurking are
not, by themselves unlawful, despite attempts of many municipalities to make
them so.").
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overbroad and reach constitutionally protected activities.'
Some scholars argue that the overbreadth doctrine applies
outside of the First Amendment context to protect other
fundamental rights.' While the Supreme Court expressly denies
the existence of the overbreadth doctrine outside of the First
Amendment, "[t]here are a limited number of cases in which the
court used overbreadth or an analysis paralleling overbreadth to
strike down statutes that were infringing upon rights falling
outside the scope of the First Amendment."87
Although the
loitering ordinance in Morales was held unconstitutional based
solely on vagueness grounds, Justice Stevens's lead opinion found
the "liberty" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to include
the freedom to loiter, suggesting a finding of overbreadth.'
Advocates of a strong overbreadth doctrine urge courts to use the
doctrine to protect other constitutional rights,89 which, after
Morales, may include loitering.'
3.

Fourth Amendment Doctrine

The Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons ... shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause ... ."' The
probable cause requirement gives courts the power to review the
84. See Sirkin, supra note 82, at 193 (arguing that loitering statutes
impermissibly reach the right to think freely).
85. See Decker, supra note 77, at 54 (arguing that the overbreadth doctrine
exists outside of the First Amendment and citing Supreme Court precedent in
support of this position); Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal
Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 264-71 (1994) (arguing that overbreadth analysis
should not be confined to the First Amendment but that it should also pertain to a
few unenumerated fundamental rights).
86. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 268-69 n.18 (1984) ("[O]utside the limited
First Amendment context, a criminal statute may not be attacked as overbroad.").
87. Decker, supra note 77, at 79. Decker discusses the cases and areas of law
where the Court recognizes overbreadth outside the First Amendment, including
the right to vote, the right to privacy against government surveillance, and the
right to travel. Id. at 79-94; see also Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156,
164 (1972). The Court notes that many activities included in the vagrancy law "are
historically part of the amenities of life as we have known them. They are not
mentioned in the Constitution or in the Bill of Rights ....
These amenities have
dignified the right of dissent...." Id.
88. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53 (1999). However, the plurality
rejected a claim that the law was overbroad on First Amendment grounds, finding
that the law did not sufficiently impact conduct protected by the First Amendment
because groups gathered for the "apparent purpose" of conveying a message would
not be subject to the law. Id. at 52-53.
89. Decker, supra note 77, at 105-07.
90. Morales, 527 U.S. at 53-54.
91. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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reasonableness of a police search and guards against harassing
and discriminatory police conduct.'
Arrests and searches not
based on probable cause are invalid and evidence seized pursuant
to an invalid search is inadmissible in court. 93 Yet, courts
recognize the need to give law enforcement flexibility in dealing
with dangerous situations as they arise.94 In Terry v. Ohio, the
Court developed a balancing test, weighing the need to search
against the resulting personal invasion and allowing a search only
if the officer has a reasonable suspicion based on articulable
facts.9" "[Blecause the crime prevention components of loitering
statutes are aimed at suspected or potential rather than incipient
or observable conduct, they may conflict with the deeply rooted
Fourth Amendment requirement that arrests must be predicated
on probable cause ....
Often, even police officers determined to apply loitering
statutes in good faith cannot justify such arrests consistent with
the principles of the Fourth Amendment. 97 In the context of
vagrancy and loitering, this problem is often caused by or
confounded by the vagueness problems that plague these laws. 99
For example, in Papachristou,the Court noted a relation between
constitutional problems of statutory vagueness and the Fourth
Amendment probable cause requirement.99 The Court argued that
vague vagrancy laws give police unfettered discretion to make
arrests based on suspicion of future criminality rather than on
probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. °°
Furthermore, in Terry, the Court acknowledged that failing to
limit police discretion may exacerbate hostile relationships

92. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968).
93. See Dunway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216 (1979); Papachristou v.
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 169 (1972); Newsome v. Malcolm, 492 F.2d 1166, 117374 (2d Cir. 1974).
94. See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 10.
95. Id. at 20-22.
96. Newsome, 492 F.2d at 1172 (finding that the loitering statute violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "not only because it fails to
specify adequately the conduct it proscribes, but also because it fails to provide
sufficiently clear guidance for police, prosecutors, and the courts so that they can
enforce the statute in a manner that is consistent with the Fourth Amendment").
97. See, e.g., Hall v. United States, 459 F.2d 831, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc)
(finding that a suspect arrested pursuant to an unconstitutionally vague vagrancy
laws was denied the protections of the Fourth Amendment).
98. See Papachristou,405 U.S. at 168-70; Hall, 459 F.2d at 837.
99. Papachristou,405 U.S. at 168-69.
100. Id.; see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 362 (1982) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (arguing that in addition to being vague, the loitering statute at issue
violated the Fourth Amendment).
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between officers and communities.'°'
C. Section 385.80: The Minneapolis Lurking Ordinance

1. Section 385.80 and the City Council
Enacted in 1960, the original Minneapolis lurking ordinance
section 385.80 read: "No person in any public or private place,
shall lurk, lie in wait or be concealed with intent to do any
mischief or to commit any crime or unlawful act."'' "In 2003, the
Community Advisory Board on Homelessness recommended that
the City repeal its lurking... ordinance, or amend [it] so that [it]
give[s] specific guidelines and criteria for illegal conduct."' 03 In
August of 2005, the Public Safety & Regulatory Services
Committee moved to amend section 385.80 by removing the
prohibition against lurking with intent to "do any mischief."'' The
City Attorney's Office supported this amendment, arguing that
"[tihe phrase 'do any mischief is antiquated and vague, and
deleting this phrase adds clarity to the ordinance." 0° The Council
passed the motion for amendment in September of 2005.106

Despite this amendment, as of April 2007, four City Council
members supported repeal of the entire statute. 107 Still, repealing
an ordinance requires a majority vote," meaning seven of
Minneapolis's thirteen council members"°9 must vote against the
ordinance in order for a repeal to succeed.

101. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968).
102. State v. Armstrong, 162 N.W.2d 357, 359 (Minn. 1968) (quoting
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 870.050 (1960)).
103. Our Lurking Ordinance, supra note 4.
104. Minneapolis City Council Official Proceedings 705 (Aug. 5, 2005) (on file
with the City Clerk's Office), available at http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/
council/archives/proceedings/2005/20050805-proceedings.pdf.
105. Lisa Godon, Assistant Minneapolis City Att'y & 5th Precinct Cmty Att'y,
Presentation to City Council: Lurking Amendment (Aug. 24, 2005) (on file with
author).
106. Minneapolis City Council Official Proceedings 770 (Sept. 2, 2005) (on file
with the City Clerk's Office), available at http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/
council/archives/proceedings/2005/20050902-proceedings.pdf.
107. Nash, supra note 2 ("Currently, city council members Gary Schiff, Betsey
Hodges, Elizabeth Glidden and Cam Gordon have already expressed their intent to
back the repeal, with council members Diane Hofstede and Don Samuels still
undecided.").
108. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 4, § 9 (2005).
109. City Council Members, http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/council/ (last
visited Jan. 22, 2008) (listing the council members by ward: Paul Ostrow, Cam
Gordon, Diane Hofstede, Barbara Johnson, Don Samuels, Robert Lilligren, Lisa
Goodman, Elizabeth Glidden, Gary Schiff, Ralph Remington, Scott Benson, Sandy
Colvin Roy, and Betsy Hodges).
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Enforcement of Section 385.80

The core disagreement between council members regarding
the lurking law revolves around police enforcement of the law. 110
Supporters of repeal feel the ordinance is used arbitrarily to
discriminate,"' pointing to examples like the arrest of Lance
Handy, a Black Minneapolis citizen.12 After Handy bought a pack
of cigarettes from a corner store in South Minneapolis, police
stopped him and asked what he was doing; they told him "this is
an area where drugs are being sold.""3 When Handy replied that
"this is an area where people buy food and go shopping, too," the
policeman frisked him, drove him to the station, and charged him
with lurking."'
After two court appearances, the charge was
dropped." 5 Despite discriminatory anecdotes like this, defenders
argue section 385.80 is a useful policing tool that keeps
neighborhoods safe." 6 Barb Johnson, City Council President,
argues: "I wouldn't want to throw out a useful tool because
1 7
officers aren't always clear about why they are citing someone."
In opposition, council member Cam Gordon feels the law is not
only discriminatory, but that "it is also not smart policing. It [is]
ineffective and wastes valuable resources that we should be
putting into preventing and eliminating crime.""8
Disagreements
over
the
effectiveness
of low-level
misdemeanor offenses like lurking led the Council on Crime and
Justice" 9 to prepare a report in November 2004 entitled Low Level
Offenses in Minneapolis: An Analysis of Arrests and Their
Outcomes."' Based on 2001 data, the study "examine[d] potential
disparities in police behavior and subsequent court outcomes for

110. See generally Nash, supra note 2 (explaining the debate over the lurking
law and different positions on the law taken by various council members).
111. Id.
112. Mosedale, supra note 2, at 13.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See generally Nash, supra note 2.
117. Mosedale, supra note 2, at 13.
118. Waiting on "Lurking" Repeal, http://secondward.blogspot.com12007-03 01
archive.html (Mar. 19 2007, 15:08 CST).
119. "The Council on Crime and Justice is an independent, non-profit ...
organization .... [Its] mission is to address the cause and consequences of crime
and violence through research, demonstration, and advocacy." Council on Crime
and Justice, http://www.crimeandjustice.org/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 20, 2008).
120. COUNCIL ON CRIME AND JUSTICE, LOW LEVEL OFFENSES IN MINNEAPOLIS:
AN ANALYSIS OF ARRESTS AND THEIR OUTCOMES 3 (2004).
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seven low level offenses." 2' The study showed significant racial
disparity occurring at the point of contact between police and
citizens. "Blacks were fifteen times more likely to be arrested than
Whites," and they were "seven times more likely than Whites to be
convicted."'22 Seventy-five percent of arrests for lurking were of
Black people.2 3 In 2006, forty-six out of fifty-five homeless
individuals arrested for "lurking' in Minneapolis were Black.'24
"[M]ost people who get arrested for low-level offenses in
Minneapolis don't get convicted."12
Only four and half percent
(4.5%) of Blacks charged with lurking and three and two-tenths
percent (3.2%) of Whites charged with lurking are actually found
guilty. 26 Even without a conviction, charges cost taxpayers a
significant price; it is estimated that "a typical lurking bust costs
taxpayers about $75-$500 for the booking fee and $250 for a night
in jail, plus four hours of wages for the cops who make the

121. Id. at 5. The seven low-level offenses studied include: "Driving after
Revocation, Driving after Cancellation, No Valid Driver's License, Disorderly
Conduct, Loitering with Intent to Commit Prostitution, Loitering with Intent to
Sell Narcotics, and Lurking with the Intent to Commit a Crime." Id.
122. Id. at 3.
123. Id. at 21.
124. Email from Lynn White, Assistant to City Attorney, Minneapolis City
Attorney's Office, to Sarah Corris Riskin, Editor-in-Chief, Law and Inequality: A
Journal of Theory and Practice (May 27, 2008, 13:18 CST) (on file with author and
journal). The data compiled by the Minneapolis City Attorney's Office came from
the Minneapolis Police Department CAPRS database. Id. For purposes of data
collection, persons were considered "homeless" if they either provided no home
address to police or listed the address of a homeless shelter. Id. From January 1,
2007 to April 11, 2008, eleven of the twenty-two homeless individuals arrested for
"lurking" were Black. Id. According to 2000 U.S. census data, the percentage of
Minneapolis's total population that identified as Black or African American was
18%. U.S. Census Bureau, State & County Quickfacts: Minneapolis, Minnesota,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/27/2743000.html (last modified Jan. 2, 2008).
An October 2006 study conducted by the Wilder Research Group found that
"[nlearly half of all homeless persons in the Twin Cities metro area are African
American." WILDER RESEARCH, OVERVIEW OF HOMELESSNESS IN MINNESOTA IN
2006: KEY FACTS FROM THE STATEWIDE SURVEY 9 (2007), available at
http://www.wilder.org/reportsummary.O.html?&no-cache=l&tx ttnews[swords] =ov
erview%20of%20homelessness&tx ttnews [tt-news] =1963&tx ttnews [backPidl=311
&cHash=a0560074dc.
125. Brandt Williams, Report: Disparity Between Arrests, Convictions Cause for
Concern,
Minnesota
Public
Radio,
Nov.
8,
2004,
available
at:
http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2004/11/08-williamsb-disparities/
(last visited Apr. 2, 2008).
126. COUNCIL ON CRIME AND JUSTICE, supra note 120, at 26. The only offense
with a lower rate of guilty convictions is prostitution, with conviction rates of 0%
for both races. Id. The next lowest conviction rate was for loitering, where 8.7% of
Whites were found guilty and eight and three-tenths percent of Blacks were found
guilty. Id.
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arrest.""7 Those advocating repeal of section 385.80 argue that,
due to low conviction levels, community resources would be better
spent elsewhere.'28
3.

The Minneapolis Loitering Law

In addition to its lurking ordinance, Minneapolis has a
detailed loitering ordinance, section 385.50.129 Originally, the law
only targeted prostitution, 30 but it was amended in 2004 to also
127. Mosedale, supra note 2, at 13 (quoting Guy Gambill, a criminal justice
advocate).
128. Our Lurking Ordinance, supra note 4. "Resources that would be better
invested in investigating real crimes and convicting real criminals as well as
addressing root causes of crime and developing community based strategies are
instead wasted on an ineffectual criminal justice 'revolving door."' Id.
129. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 385.50 (2005). The relevant
portions of the ordinance reads as follows:
(a) No person shall loiter on the streets or in a public place or in a place
open to the public with intent to solicit for the purposes of prostitution,
illegal narcotic sale, distribution, purchase or possession, or any other act
prohibited by law.
(b) No person shall be present in a motor vehicle stopped, parked or
operated on the street, in a public place or in a place open to the public
with intent to solicit for the purposes of prostitution, illegal narcotic sale,
distribution, purchase or possession, or any other act prohibited by law.
(c) Among the circumstances which may be considered in determining
whether a person intends to loiter for the purposes of engaging in
prostitution are whether a person:
(1)Repeatedly beckons to, stops or attempts to stop, or engages
passersby in conversation;
(2)Repeatedly stops or attempts to stop motor vehicle operators by
hailing, waving of arms or any other bodily gesture;
(3)Is a known prostitute or procurer of prostitutes; or
(4)Inquires whether a potential patron, procurer or a prostitute is a
police officer or searches for articles that would identify a police officer or
requests the touching or exposing of male or female genitals or female
breasts to prove that the person is not a police officer.
(d) Among the circumstances which may be considered in determining
whether a person intends to loiter for the purpose of engaging in
distributing illegal narcotics are whether a person:
(1)Repeatedly beckons to, stops or attempts to stop, or engages
passersby in conversation.
(2)Repeatedly stops or attempts to stop motor vehicle operators by
hailing, waving of arms or other bodily gesture.
(3)Acts as a look-out.
(4)Transfers small objects or packages of currency or any other thing of
value in a furtive fashion which would lead an observer to believe or
ascertain that a drug transaction has or is about to occur.
(5)Carries small objects or packages in one's mouth and transfers such
objects or packages to another person for currency or any other thing of
value, or swallows or attempts to swallow the objects or packages if
approached by a law enforcement officer.
Id.
130. Minneapolis City Council Official Proceeding 409-10 (May 28, 2004) (on file
at the City Clerk's office), available at http:www.ci.minneapolis.us/council/

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 26:467

target drug-related loitering.13' Section 385.50 provides that "[nlo
person shall loiter on the streets or in a public place or in a place
open to the public with intent to solicit for the purposes of
prostitution, illegal narcotic sale, distribution, purchase or
possession, or any other act prohibited by law." 3' The law goes on
to articulate specific circumstances and acts that may be
considered in assessing criminal intent. 13 Police use the loitering
law much more frequently than the lurking law." 4 Police also use
the loitering law with more success; in 2001, almost twice as many
of those arrested for loitering than for lurking are found guilty."'
4.

Minnesota Court History

In State v. Duggan,"' the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled
that the State must prove the intent element in order to support a
conviction for loitering or lurking." 7 In State v. Armstrong,"' the
court considered the constitutionality of both the Minneapolis
loitering and lurking ordinances."' The court found the loitering
and lurking ordinances were neither unconstitutionally vague nor
violative of constitutional due process.' 4'
The court based its
decision in large part on the fact that similar ordinances had
existed without challenge in Minnesota and elsewhere in the
country for most of the century. 141 Subsequent Supreme Court
decisions in cases like Papachristou'' and Morales,"' however,
essentially negate the precedent upon which the Armstrong
archives/proceedings/2004/20040528-proceedings.pdf.
The loitering ordinance
originally read: "No person shall loiter on the streets or in a public place or in a
place open to the public with intent to solicit for the purposes of prostitution or any
other act prohibited by law." Id.
131. Id.
132. § 385.50(a).
133. Id.
134. COUNCIL ON CRIME AND JUSTICE, supra note 120, at 26 (showing that there
were 1,317 Black population citations and 354 White population citations for
loitering in 2001, compared with 116 Black population citations and 30 White
population citations for lurking in 2001).
135. Id. at 26 (showing that 8.7% of White and 8.3% of Black persons were found
guilty of loitering, compared to 3.2% of White and 4.5% of Black persons found
guilty of lurking).
136. 192 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
137. See id. at 185 (holding that the State failed to prove intent and that the
officer based his arrest merely upon his own suspicion).
138. 162 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. 1968).
139. Id. at 357.
140. Id. at 359.
141. Id.
142. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972).
143. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 41 (1999).
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decision is based. 4 4 It is likely that if a similar case reached the
court today, the Minnesota Supreme Court would reach a different
conclusion regarding the validity of the laws. Analyzing section
385.80 in light of current case history, a court might well find the
law unconstitutional for vagueness, overbreadth, and/or for
violating the Fourth Amendment.
II. Lurking Unconstitutionality: Analyzing Section 385.80
for Vagueness, Overbreadth, and Fourth Amendment
Violations
Section 385.80, the Minneapolis lurking law, states that "[nlo
person, in any public or private place, shall lurk, lie in wait or be
concealed with intent to commit any crime or unlawful act."145 The
term "lurk" is the heart of the ordinance and is what makes the
ordinance unique from other criminal statutes. "Lying in wait"
and being "concealed" with intent to commit a crime are already
punishable under attempt laws.'46 Thus, those who commit these
acts can be arrested for attempt of the contemplated crime rather
than pursuant to section 385.80. As lurking is the only conduct
prohibited by section 385.80 that is not concurrently covered by
other laws, the remainder of this Article focuses on the term "lurk"
in arguing that section 385.80 is unconstitutional.
A. Vagueness
Section 385.80 should be found void-for-vagueness both
because it fails to give citizens adequate notice as to what conduct
is prohibited and because it encourages arbitrary police
enforcement.
Section 385.80 does not satisfy the notice
requirement of the vagueness doctrine because it "fails to give a
person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated
conduct is forbidden by the statute."47 Neither the statute itself
nor the language of the Minneapolis Code of Ordinances defines
the term "lurk."4 8 The Minnesota Supreme Court definition of a
"persistent presence or a furtive movement in a place" fails to
144. See supra Part I.A.2 (detailing cases that successfully challenged lurking
and loitering ordinances).
145. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 385.50 (2005).
146. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(2)(a) (1962) (listing "lying in wait" as an act
to be considered in establishing guilt for criminal attempt); DRESSLER, supra note
37, at 91-93 (4th ed. 2006) (describing the list of factual circumstances where an
actor's conduct may be considered a substantial step toward the commission of a
crime).
147. Papachristou,405 U.S. at 162.
148. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 385.50 (2005).
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sufficiently clarify matters. 4 '
Like the statute at issue in
Papachristou,section 385.80 brings within its sweep conduct that
cannot conceivably be considered criminal, like being "persistently
present" in a place."' Under the ordinance, innocent conduct, such
as waiting for a ride, standing outside and smoking,"' or stepping
into a doorway to avoid the rain, particularly if carried out in a
"bad" neighborhood, may be considered lurking.'
The statute
does not even contain a list of examples of conduct that give rise to
Nor
arrest and prosecution, leaving the public without notice.'
does the requirement of intent to commit a crime put the public on
notice; it is not illegal to stand in public and think bad thoughts."'
Without reasonably defining "lurking" and conduct relevant to the
arrest decision, section 385.80 does not give the public a
reasonable opportunity to know what the law "commands and
forbids, " "' and it denies citizens the opportunity to tailor their
behavior accordingly.
The Minneapolis lurking ordinance also fails the second
prong of the vagueness doctrine because it fails to establish
minimal guidelines for enforcement. The vagueness deficiencies of
section 385.80 under the notice prong of the vagueness test
contribute to the ordinance's enforcement issues. "Definiteness is
designedly avoided so as to allow the net to be cast at large ....
Because the term "lurk" may encompass a wide variety of
behaviors and is not narrowed by the statute, section 385.80
encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. ' Further,
section 385.80 does not delineate specific guidelines for law
enforcement to follow when determining whether to arrest. The
ordinance is not sufficiently narrowed by the requirement of
criminal intent because section 385.80 gives police absolute
discretion to decide if a citizen, absent any overt act, has criminal
intent. 5" When a statute fails to provide minimal guidelines for
149. State v. Armstrong, 162 N.W.2d 357, 360 (Minn. 1968).
150. See Papachristou,405 U.S. at 162.
151. Mosedale, supra note 2, at 13 (telling the story of a man arrested for lurking
who had just purchased cigarettes at a store in an area known for drug dealing).
152. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 57 (1999) (arguing that much
innocent conduct is hard to distinguish from loitering).
153. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
155. Papachristou,405 U.S. at 162.
156. Id. at 166. (citing Lan Zetta v. New Jersey, 206 U.S. 451 (1939)).
157. See Morales, 527 U.S. at 41 (finding the Chicago loitering ordinance, which
defined loitering as "to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose," gave
officers absolute discretion to determine what activities constituted loitering).
158. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 385.80 (2005). Loitering
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enforcement, "a criminal statute may permit a standardless sweep
that allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their
personal predilections.""'
Evidence clearly suggests that
Minneapolis police officers perform just such standardless and
discriminatory sweeps.
In 2001, Black people accounted for
seventy-five percent (75%) of total lurking arrests, 6 ' and in 2006
they accounted for eighty-four percent (84%) of lurking charges. 1 '
Moreover, the difference between the number of arrests and actual
convictions demonstrates that police use section 385.80 to prevent
crime by removing "undesirable persons"-usually minorities and
the homeless-from the streets without a strong case.16 The lack
of minimal guidelines in the ordinance itself and the arbitrary
enforcement history of section 385.80 demonstrate that the
ordinance also fails the second prong of the void-for-vagueness
doctrine.
B. Overbreadth
The vagueness of the lurking law contributes to its
overbreadth. Section 385.80 is unconstitutionally overbroad
because the broad language of the ordinance allows law
enforcement and courts to reach and criminalize constitutionally
protected behavior. The lurking law reaches rights protected by
the First Amendment, including association, assembly, and
thought. Section 385.80 also essentially prohibits loitering, a
constitutionally protected right deserving protection under the
overbreadth doctrine. 63 Section 385.80 is similar to loitering laws,
which prohibit loitering with intent to commit a specific crime,

itself is not a crime and is in fact a liberty interest protected under the Due Process
Clause. Therefore, mere loitering is an insufficient act from which to determine
criminal intent. Morales, 527 U.S. at 53.
159. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (citing Smith v. Goguen, 415
U.S. 566, 574 (1974)).
160. See COUNCIL ON CRIME AND JUSTICE, supra note 120, at 26, (showing that
there were 1,317 Black population citations and 354 White population citations for
loitering in 2001, compared with 116 Black population citations and 30 White
population citations for lurking in 2001).
161. Email from Lynn White, Assistant to City Attorney, Minneapolis City
Attorney's Office, to Sarah Corris Riskin, Editor-in-Chief, Law and Inequality: A
Journal of Theory and Practice (May 27, 2008, 13:18 CST) (on file with author and
journal) (citing statistics from the Minneapolis Police Department CAPRS database
that, in 2006, 46 of 55 "homeless" individuals cited for lurking were Black).
162. See Williams, supra note 125 (discussing the disparity between arrests and
convictions and the concern that laws like the loitering law are being used
discriminatorily).
163. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
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such as prostitution,' in that it prohibits lurking with the general
intent to commit a crime. 65'
However, section 385.80 is even
broader than specific intent loitering statutes like those at issue in
Coleman66 and Farber6 ' because it allows police officers to arrest
for lurking anyone whom they suspect of having the intent to
commit any crime. '68 Like the ordinance in Coleman, section
385.80 may chill freedom of expression and association rights if
police arrest those whom they believe to be lurking with intent to
commit the crime of soliciting prostitution. 169 Or, police may use
the ordinance to deny the right to assembly, particularly in
disfavored areas, similar to the Chicago ordinance struck down in
Farber.!"° This, in fact, happens as attested to by Minneapolis
resident Lance Handy, whom police appear to have arrested
merely for his presence in an area known for drug-dealing."' Such
arrests for lurking may unduly chill the exercise of the First
Amendment rights of expression, association, and assembly by
Minneapolis residents, particularly in neighborhoods with
statistically higher rates of crime. 7'
Additionally, section 385.80 is overbroad in that it infringes
upon the constitutionally protected freedom of thought. Section
385.50 allows punishment for mere thoughts because it requires
Because
no actus reus beyond the act of lurking itself."'
"[1]oitering, wandering, idling, and lurking are not, by themselves
unlawful, despite attempts of many municipalities to make them
so,""' lurking alone cannot serve as the unequivocal act upon
which to base a mens rea of intent to commit a crime.'75 A law
that gives police absolute discretion to determine who intends to
commit a crime is overbroad because it infringes upon an
individual's freedom of thought and encourages arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement."'
164. See, e.g., Coleman v. City of Richmond, 364 S.E.2d 239, 242-43 (Va. Ct.
App. 1988) (prohibiting loitering with intent to solicit prostitution).
165. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 385.80 (2005).

166. Coleman, 364 S.E.2d at 239.
167. Farber v. Rochford, 407 F. Supp. 529, 529 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
168. § 385.80.
169. Coleman, 364 S.E.2d at 239.
170. Farber,407 F. Supp. at 529.
171. See Mosedale, supra note 2, at 13 (detailing the arrest of Lance Hardy).
172. Williams, supra note 125 (noting a high number of arrests of Black men in
North Minneapolis for livability crimes like loitering).
173. § 385.80.
174. Coleman, 364 S.E.2d at 242.
175. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
176. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 464 (1987) (holding that a law
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a
recognizes
precedent
Court
Supreme
Finally,
The Minnesota
constitutionally protected right to loiter.177
Supreme Court recognizes that "'lurking' is not significantly
different from 'loitering,"'78 and it follows that the Constitution
also protects lurking. To the extent that courts apply overbreadth
principles and analysis to the protection of rights outside of the
First Amendment,'79 a court may well find section 385.80
overbroad for infringing upon a constitutionally protected liberty
interest.
While the overbreadth doctrine is "strong medicine," 8 ' courts
do not hesitate to use overbreadth in overturning laws that
substantially interfere with constitutionally protected rights.
Loitering and lurking laws like section 385.80 infringe upon the
First Amendment rights of assembly, association, and thought and
upon the liberty interest of loitering.18"' A court reviewing the
constitutionality of section 385.80 should find the prohibition
against lurking overbroad because it reaches these constitutionally
protected activities.
C. FourthAmendment
In the context of loitering laws, Fourth Amendment analysis
closely mirrors vagueness analysis.'82 A vague loitering statute,
such as section 385.80, may fail to satisfy the Fourth Amendment
probable cause requirement because it encourages arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement. 8 3 Applying the balancing test from
Terry, in which an officer may conduct a search only if he or she
has a reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts, '8 arrests
to the
made pursuant to section 385.80 are unconstitutional due
8
lack of arrest criteria contained within the statute itself.' 5
The vague proscriptions of section 385.80 violate the Fourth
Amendment because they allow police to arrest individuals for

giving police absolute discretion to arrest those who use "harassing" language to a
police officer is overbroad and encourages discriminatory enforcement).
177. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52-53 (1999); Papachristou v.
City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972).
178. State v. Armstrong, 162 N.W.2d 357, 360 (Minn. 1968).
179. See supra Part I.B.2 (detailing the court's use of the overbreadth doctrine).
180. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973) (stating that application of
the overbreadth doctrine to strike down a law is "strong medicine").
181. See Decker, supra note 77, at 65-79.
182. Papachristou,405 U.S. at 168-69.
183. Id.
184. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968).
185. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 385.80 (2005).
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suspected conduct rather than for observable conduct. 8 '
In
Newsome v. Malcolm, the court found that the statute, which
prohibited loitering in "circumstances which justify suspicion that
(a person) may be engaged or about to engage in crime," 1 7 allowed
arrests based on the whim of the policeman rather than upon the
conduct of the individual.188 Similarly, by allowing the police
unfettered discretion to arrest those whom they believe to be
lurking "with intent to commit a crime,"'89 section 385.80
essentially allows police to arrest anyone whom they find
suspicious. As noted by the Court in Papachristou,"[a] direction
by a legislature to the police to arrest all 'suspicious' persons
would not pass constitutional muster. A vagrancy prosecution
may be merely the cloak for a conviction which could not be
obtained on the real but undisclosed grounds for the arrest."8 '
Section 385.80, which contains no definition or examples of
prohibited conduct, violates the Fourth Amendment because it is
so vague that it provides no criteria upon which law enforcement
officers may base their suspicion and arrests.
D. Section 385.50: An Alternative to Section 385.80?
The city of Minneapolis should repeal section 385.80 for a
number of reasons, primarily because it is unconstitutionally
vague, overbroad, and violates the Fourth Amendment.'
Moreover, the lurking law is an ineffective policing tool that
consumes officers' time, wastes taxpayer dollars, and harms
community-police relations.'
Finally, the lurking law is
redundant. As previously noted, the Minnesota Supreme Court
found that the terms "lurking" and "loitering" are not significantly
different.' While section 385.80 prohibits lurking with the intent
to commit a crime, 9 4 section 385.50 also prohibits loitering with
intent to commit any act prohibited by law,' 9 rendering the
186. See Newsome v. Malcolm, 492 F.2d 1166, 1173 (2d Cir. 1974); Farber v.
Rochford, 407 F. Supp. 529 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
187. Newsome, 492 F.2d at 1173.
188. Id.
189. § 385.80.
190. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 169 (1972) (citing People
v. Moss, 309 N.Y. 429, 430 (1956)).
191. See supra Parts IIA-C (discussing the constitutional deficiencies of §
385.80).
192. See supra Part I.C.2 (illustrating problems of uneven enforcement and
undue cost).
193. State v. Armstrong, 162 N.W.2d 357, 360 (Minn. 1968).
194. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 385.80 (2005).
195. § 385.50.
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lurking ordinance unnecessary and duplicative. If the loitering
ordinance already serves a similar function and can be used in
place of the lurking law, the question becomes: is the loitering
ordinance constitutional?
While loitering laws in general raise a myriad of
constitutional issues, some loitering laws have been found
Unlike the lurking law, which suffers from a
constitutional."
number of constitutional deficiencies, 197 section 385.50, the
Minneapolis loitering ordinance, is a carefully constructed law
likely to pass constitutional muster. Due to its more detailed
nature, section 385.50 may not be unconstitutionally vague.
Section 385.50 targets more than mere loitering; it targets
loitering with the intent to commit a specified criminal act, namely
soliciting for prostitution or drug-related crimes. 98 Additionally,
like the ordinance upheld in Howard, section 385.50 requires
specific intent and contains a list of overt acts to consider in
making an arrest.199
The acts and circumstances that law
enforcement officers may consider in determining intent include:
repeatedly beckoning passersby, asking whether a potential
patron is a police officer, and transferring small objects in a furtive
fashion. °°
Still, even loitering laws that require intent and give
have
been
found
prohibited
conduct
examples
of
unconstitutional. 0' In Coleman, the court found the law overbroad
if the acts alone were sufficient to demonstrate intent, whereas the
law was vague if the acts were insufficient by themselves because
it no longer required an intent element. 2 While all loitering laws
run the risk of violating constitutionally protected rights,2 °2
loitering laws like section 385.50 that require intent and give
examples of prohibited conduct are much more likely to survive a
constitutional attack on vagueness grounds because the level of
detail provided gives citizens notice of prohibited conduct and

196. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
197. See supra Parts IIA-C.
198. § 385.50.
199. City of Cleveland v. Howard, 532 N.E.2d 1325, 1330 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1987);
see also City of Tacoma v. Luvene, 827 P.2d 1374, 1386 (Wash. 1992); see also §
385.50.
200. § 385.50(d).
201. See sources cited supra note 31.
202. Coleman v. City of Richmond, 364 S.E.2d 239, 244 (1988). See supra Part
I.B.1 for more discussion on Coleman.
203. See Berns, supra note 37, at 717 (arguing that loitering laws must be
sufficiently detailed to be constitutional).
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204

limits police discretion in making arrests.
The level of detail provided by section 385.50 also diminishes
the likelihood of a successful challenge based on overbreadth.
Courts have found some loitering statutes similar to section 385.50
unconstitutionally overbroad. In Coleman, for example, the court
found a statute prohibiting loitering with the intent to engage in
prostitution chilled the First Amendment freedoms of expression
and association.0 5 However, because the overbreadth doctrine is
"strong medicine," courts are loath to use the overbreadth doctrine
to invalidate a statute unless there is no possible saving
construction.2 0' The Supreme Court is particularly deferential to
any saving interpretations provided by a state supreme court. °7
The Minnesota Supreme Court interprets the loitering law to
require proof of intent for conviction of loitering. 28 The intent
element, combined with the list of delineated acts, sufficiently
narrows section 385.50 and prevents the ordinance from
impermissibly reaching activity protected by the First
Amendment.
Finally, section 385.50 provides a list of circumstances police
may consider in determining intent to loiter, 29 allowing officers to
comply with the strictures of the Fourth Amendment. Unlike
21
'
section 385.80 and the statutes in Newsome" ' and Papachristou,
section 385.50 limits police discretion by requiring police to make
arrests based on probable cause as articulated in the list of
conduct provided in the statute. 12 By providing a list of conduct,
section 385.50 allows law enforcement to base arrests on
observable conduct rather than upon mere suspicion of future
criminality.213
The detailed nature of section 385.80 suggests that the
loitering ordinance may be a suitable, indeed superior, substitute
The ordinance's coverage area already
for the lurking law.
overlaps sufficiently to make section 385.80 superfluous.
204. See cases cited supra note 30.
205. Coleman, 364 S.E.2d at 244.
206. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973).
207. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 43 (1999) ("This Court,
however, cannot impose a limiting construction that a state supreme court has
failed to adopt.").
208. State v. Duggan, 192 N.W.2d 185, 185 (Minn. 1971).
209. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 385.50(c) (2005).
210. Newsome v. Malcolm, 492 F.2d 1166, 1173 (2d Cir. 1974).
211. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 163 (1972).
212. § 385.50(c).
213. See Newsome, 492 F.2d at 1173 (finding a loitering statute that did not
provide clear guidance for police enforcement violated the Fourth Amendment).
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Moreover, the loitering law is more likely to withstand
constitutional attacks based on vagueness, overbreadth, and the
Fourth Amendment.
Conclusion
While community members are justifiably concerned with
crime rates and with keeping neighborhoods safe, Minneapolis
cannot sacrifice the constitutional rights of its citizens in order to
keep sweeping criminal statutes on its books. Although the
Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the lurking ordinance in 1968,
in light of subsequent Supreme Court precedent, the Minnesota
Supreme Court should find section 385.80 unconstitutional today.
Potential challenges include vagueness, overbreadth, and Fourth
Amendment violations.214 The vague wording of section 385.80
fails to give citizens notice of prohibited conduct and encourages
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.21
Further, section
385.80 is overbroad in allowing the ordinance to reach conduct
protected by the First Amendment. 16 Finally, use of the law by
law enforcement violates the Fourth Amendment by encouraging
arrests not based on probable cause.2 1 7
In addition to the constitutional deficiencies of section 385.80,
the existence of section 385.50, Minneapolis's carefully constructed
and detailed loitering ordinance, renders the lurking law
unnecessary and superfluous.2 "8
The loitering law not only
overlaps with the coverage area of the lurking law,219 but it is also
a more effective policing tool that is used more frequently by law
enforcement and results in higher conviction rates.220
More
importantly, the detailed language of section 385.50 avoids the
constitutional pitfalls of the lurking ordinance by requiring intent
and providing a list of examples of prohibited conduct. 221 The
Minneapolis City Council should repeal section 385.80 because of
214. See supra Part IIA-C (analyzing possible legal challenges to the lurking
law).
215. See supra Part II.A (reviewing vagueness jurisprudence and examples of
arbitrary enforcement of the lurking statute).
216. See supra notes 77-87 (quoting sources linking the First Amendment
freedom of thought to the right to loiter).
217. See supra Part I1.C (providing constitutional analysis of lurking law and
finding that the law violates the Fourth Amendment).
218. See supra Part II.D (detailing the constitutional advantages of the loitering
statute).
219. See supra Part II.D (discussing overlap between the loitering law and the
lurking law).
220. COUNCIL ON CRIME AND JUSTICE, supra note 120, at 26.
221. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 385.50 (2005).
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its unconstitutionality, its ineffectiveness, and its overlaps with
other applicable ordinances. Rather than subject the city to a
potentially lengthy and costly legal battle it is likely to lose,
Minneapolis should repeal section 385.80, removing this lurking
unconstitutional ordinance from its books.

